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In the Supreme Court of the Stale et Utah
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COM-

P ANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,

a corporation,

Case No.
11029

Def end ant and Respondent,

and

WALKER BANK & TRUST COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
XATURE OF THE CASE
This is the second action brought by appellant
against respondent and defendant Walker Bank & Trust
Company to recover fonds allegedly disbursed on checks
drawn on appellant's account with defendant Walker
Bank & Tnu;t Company after having been presented to
and honored by respondent.

DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER C01JRT
Rt:>SJJOndent does not agree with two statements in
nppellant's brief n~garding the disposition of the case

m the lower court. First, the Complaint which is the
~ubject of this appeal, although dated Februar.\" G, 19G7,
was actually filed April 10, 19G7, and second, respondt>nt
(•]aims the dismissal of the first case ·was with prejudiee.
R<'spondent "'ill, tlwrefore, restate the disposition of tlH>
(•ase in the lmn•r court.
.Ap]wllant filed a Complaint against rPspondPnt and
def Pndant vValker Bank & 'I'rrn;;t Compan.\- which was
dismissed as to respondent. Appellant filed a Pdition
for lntPrmediate Appeal from this dismisiml whieh was
dPnit>d and, therPafkr, on April 10, 19G7, appellant filed
n new Complaint against rPspondPnt and <lefondant
"'Walker Bank & 'I1rust Company. Upon respondent's motion the second Complaint ·was dismissed as to respondent on August 30, 1967, and it is from this Order of
Dismissal of tlw second Complaint that ap1w1lant lias
appeale<l.

HE>spondent s<•Pks an affirmation of tht- OrdPr
Dismissal 1::•nten•cl h~- tlw lowPr eonrt.
~'l'ATK~TKNT o~~

or

FACTS

FIH~T CO~lPLAl:'.\'T:

On Augnst

~(i,

1%(i, npp<>llant fil(•d a Complaint in

the Third .Jndi<·inl [fo:trid Court i11 and for

~:lit

Lak(•
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County, State of Utah, against respondent and defendant
Walker Bank 'J1rust Company, Case No. 166815. The
allegations of this first Complaint must be analyzed
here since they hear on the disposition of the second
Complaint.
The first Complaint alleged two causes of action
against respondent. Count I of the First Cause of Action
in suhstanee alleged that 32 cheeks, endorsed with signatnrPs otlwr than those of the named payees, were drawn
11pon a1qwl1ant's aeeou11t \Yith deft>ndant ~Walker Bank
& 'l'ni:-:t Cmnpan~' nnd presPnted to respondent hy one
Cu~- K DaYis, 01· his ag<~nt, for deposit. None of the
<'hecks werf• payahl(" to Davis, hut they were cr0dited hy
n·spondE>nt to an aceount or aieeounh~ bPlonging to Davis.
Based upon tht>se all0ged facts, appellant claimed that
l'PspmHlPnt was negligent in honoring the checks presented to it in ( l) failing to cornparP the endon1emrnts on
Ute elwcks with the signature (•ard of Davis; (2) failing to
1·pqnire thP enclors<'nwnt of Davis or the prrson depositing tlw chPcks: and ( :i) failing to reeognize a scheme
\\'hi('h would ha-w hc•en diselost>d hy thP multiplicity of
transnetions. As a result of the allt>ged negligence, appellant elairned tliat it snffrn•d damage in the amount of
~;1

;>o.2(i:-l. ( n.

~31.

::'.'? i.

C'ount I I of t!tP First Causc> of A'C'tion alleged that
t lw c'rnlor:,;l'li1rnt:-< on tl1<' clw('ks wPrp forgPriei', and that

d<•c;pi t" 1lH' forgf•riPs, rP:,;pondPn1 honored the chec•ks, in
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violation of a duty to appellant to determine the genuineness of the t>ndorst>menh;, and that as a rt>sult then•of,
appellant was damaged in the amount of $150,265. (R. 32,
33).
The Rt>cond Cause of A('tion of tht> fin;;t Complaint
c·laimed that in ::\lay, 1963, thrt>e elwcks totali-ng $-+7,000
WPre drawn against appellant's aeeonnt with clef Pndant
\Valker Bank & Trust Company signed by Davis and 01w
other employee of appellant, payable in two instanePs to
respondPnt and in one instanee to re>spondent and a pa~·pe
known as Treasur<• ~lountain Finanee. Tlw Second Cans<>
of Aetion further alleged that om~ of tht> checks was erPdited by respondent to tlw aeeount of 1'rr>asure ~lountain
]1Jnterprises, a sole proprietorship of Davis, and that t\rn
of the cht>cks ·were credited by respondent to the account
of Tn~asnre Mountain Finance, another solP proprietorship of Davi;,;. App<->llant tlwn alleged that respondent
was nt>gligPnt in failing to aet in a rc->asonable and prndPnt
rnannPr eonsistent with hanking standards in the an-'a
in transfrrrinµ: fnnd:-; lwlonginp: to appPllant to DaYis
without n•qui ring mi~· dPrnonstration of authority for
tlu· transfrr arnl \\·ithout rPqui ring tl1<' <>ndorsPrnent ol'
Davis. (R ::rn, :H). Tlie Third CausP of Aetion was dirPeted only against dPfrndant \ValkPr Bank & Trust Com}Jany and is not in\'f1ln'n }H'T'<'.
On Oetoher 1U, 1!J(i(), l'Psp<md(•nt l'i l<'d a Motion to Dismiss thP first Complaint arnl atta<'hPd an Affidavit jdPntifying Davis as app<'llm1t',, manaµ:Pr. A 1).;·nmPnt \\·a,-: 1H•:H1l
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on the Motion to Dismiss, and on January 12, 1967, the
Court signed and entered its Order of Dismissal in Civil
No. 1GG815. The Order was prepared with the following
language included:
'' ... plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Zions
First National Bank be, and the same hereby is,
di·smissed ·with prejudice on the ground ... "
Appellant objected to the inclusion of the words "with
prejudice," claiming that the dismissal was without prejudicP. 'T'lH' <lnestion wlwtJwr tlH~ words "with prejudice"
or "without prPjndiN.''' should he in the Order was submitted to tlw Court, and thP words "dismissed with prejudic0'' were crossed out hv
. the Court and onlv. the word
"dismissed" inserted. The Order of Dismis·sal reads:
~-

..... plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Zions
First National Bank he, and the same hereby, is
dismissed on the gronnd ... " (R. 39).
Appellant filed Petition for IntPnnediate .Appeal from
this OrdPr of Dismissal whirh was denil•fl.
~EC~OND

C'O:\IPLAL\'"T:

On April 10, 19()7, appellant filPd a new Complaint

in tlw Third .Tudieial ffo-;trict Conrt in and for Salt Lake
Count)' aµ:ainst rPspornh•nt and flpfendant vValker Bank
& Trust ('ornpany. Cast' No. 17140(). It is this case that

6

is now before this Court on appeal. Appellant's hrief on
pages 4, 24 and 25 refers to the ne\Y Complaint in ca~w
No. 171406 as an Amended Complaint. 'This is an incorrect reference. The pleading was not an Amended Complaint, but a new Complaint in a nPw action. (R 1-S). 'l'lw
new Complaint also contajns three cam;es of action, the
first two direeh•d against respondt~nt. All nine paragraphs in Count I of th0 First Cam.;0 of Action in tl1l'
first Complaint are repeated vPrhatim in the corresponding Count of thf' new Complaint. Exactly the same all(•gations of fact involving the acceptance hy rPspondent of
the :32 check£' and their deposit in acc·ounts owned by
Davis are made to support a claim of neglig·ence (R. 1, 2),
and the new Complaint then adds the following allegations:
"9. That the honoring of said clwcks with
knowledge of the ahove and foregoing facts
amounts to had fajth on the part of the defendant,
Zions First National Bank.
''10. That the def Pndant, Zions .B~irst National Bank, imid on sueh <>hecks with actual
knowlPdg1~ that Ouy E. Davis was committing a
brt>aeh of his fi(hwiary obligation in making a
dt'posit of sueh eheeb." (H. 2).
Count 11 of thP Virst CansP of Action of th<· nt>w Complaint also rPpPats Pxactly all six paragraphs of tlw
<·orrpsponding Count of tlw first CoHIJllaint allPging in
f'nhstancr· that tl11• <·ndorf'PHWnts on tlw :3:2 elweks

\\'('l'l'
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forgPriPs and that respondent hreached a duty to determinP the genuineness of the endorsements. (R. 2, 3). The
new Complaint adds one paragraph to this Count, alleg1Ilg":

"5. 'I'hat the failure to 1wrform the duty
with knowledgP of the facts alh~ged in Count I of
this Complaint amounts to had faith on the part of
the defendant, Zions First National Bank."
The Second Cause of Action in the new Complaint is identical with the Second Canst> of Action in the first Complaint except that fivP words have been added to
paragraph G. The Seeond Cause of Action involves three
checks in tlw total amount of $47,000, one of which was
payable to rPspondt.•nt and Treasure Mountain Finance
and two of whieh WeI'P payah)e only to rt•spondent. rro
tl1e claim of negligPncP, appellant addPd "and acted in
had faith."
On

4, 19G7, rt>spondent filPd a Motion to Dismiss
tlH• IW\\" 'Colllplaiut in CasP No. 171-to<i and attaehed to
the ~'lotion r<>rtified eopiPs of tltf' Complaint in Case No.
l (j()81 ;j and tlu· Ord<•r of Dismissal of that Complaint.
(H. 12-:n ). F'ollowing arµ;urnent on this Motion to Disllliss, tlw Court entPrPd an Order of Dismissal on August
:lo, mm, disrnissiJJµ; t]1e Complaint as to rPspondent in
CasP No. 17140<i. ( H. :.?!\ :.W). Tlw Ord Pr was prepared
~la)·

ineluding the wonls ''dismis;.;;Pd \\·ith prejndire," and
apJH•Jlant made no oli.iection to th<' inelusion of the words
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"with prejudice." This appeal was then taken from the
Order of Dismissal in Case No. 171406.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S FIRST COMPLAINT IN CIVIL NO. 166815 BARS APPELLANT
FROM MAINTAINING THE INSTANT ACTION
SINCE THE CLAIMS OF APPELLANT IN THE
INSTANT CASE ARE RES JUDICATA BETWEEN
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT.

The legal effect of the Order of Dismissal of appellant's first Complaint in Case No. 166815 was a judgment
on the merits of the Complaint and, therefore, a dismissal
with prejudice. The Motion to Dismiss the first Complaint was based on the grounds that it failed to state
n claim against respondent upon which relief could be
granted and failP<l to state a elaim against respondent
upon whirh relief eonld he granted by reason of thP
applieation of tlw provisions of Title 22, Chapter 1,
l:.C.A.(1953). Tlw Motion was made pursuant to Rnle
12(b), U.R.C.P., and has attaehed to it an Affidavit
setting forth the fad that Davis was appellant's manager.
(R. 37). r111w atta('lrnwnt of the Affidavit allowed the
lo"·er court to trPat th<' Motion und~·r Rule 56, -C.R.C.P.
The Motion was grant<>d and the Order of Dismissal
prepared with tlw words ''dismissed "'ith prejndicP" in-

9

eluded. Appellant objected to the words "with prejudice,"
and the lowt>r court struck from the Order "dismissed
with prejudice" and inserted only the word "dismissed,"
rPfusing to add "without prejudice." Pnder these circum::tances, the Order was that the Complaint was dismissed,
with the question wlwther with or without prejudice
n•sting on the application of tlw law to a dismissal under
Uules (12b) and 56, U.R.C.P.
Rule 4l(b ), U.R.C.P., with reference to the effect
of an involuntary dismissal, in part provides:
" ... Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, the dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or for improper vemw, or for lack of an indispensible party, operates as an adjudication on the
merits.'~

Counsel for respondent has bf'en unable to find a l;tah
case on tht> question of the application of the quoted
portion of Rul<-~ -11 (h), F.H.C.P., to a motion to dismiss
a complaint rn1der Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. However, our

Hule 41(b) is similar to Rule H(h), :F'.R.C.P., and in the
case of Wi11eqor z:. Slim Olsen, Inc., 12:! Ftah 487, 252
P.:Zd 205, involving a Hnle -1-l(b) question, this Court
stated that dPeisions construing similar Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure could he properly examined in cases

i1ffoh'in.g the rtah Rul0s.
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The federal courts on occasion have dealt ·with the
question whether a dismissal under Rule 12(b), F.R.C.P.
is a ruling on the merits of a case and, therefore, with
prejudice. In Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d. 20, the court
recognized that the granting of a motion to dismiss would
result in a ruling on the nwrits. In that case, plaintiff
brought suit for declaratory judgment against defendant
to det(•rmine the validity of an order affirming a deportation orclc•r. The district court di~nnissed the Complaint
with prejudice, and in doing so, relied upon certain
memoranda of points and authorities out·side the pleadings which containf'd assertions of fact. The Circuit Court
reven1ed the dismissal on the ground that the fad alleged
in the memoranda could not he properly com;idered in
ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P.
However, on the point in question here, the Court
acknowledged that propt'r dismiss als under Rule 12(b ),
F.R.C.P., were with prejudiee. The Court said:
1

"We condude that the Order hehrw was not om\
for summary judgment, hut was what the Distrid
Court :;;aid it was: 'an order dismissing the Complaint with prejudict>.' Nor can we accept the view
that dismisHal 'v.~ith prejudi(·e' lends support to tlu-'
argument that summary judgnwnt waH g·1<antPd.
'The Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
rnises1 matffr in bar and, if sustai•npd 1rithout
lea1·e f.o proceed further, results in judgment on
the merits.'" (ErnphasiH added).
Similar recognition of the effeet of a dismissal under
12(b), F.R.·C.P., wa;-; givPn in Mullen /'. Fitz Sinwns &

11

( 'onnell. DrPdge and Dock Co., 172 F. 2d. 601, wlwre

th<~

Court of Ap1wals for the Seventh Circuit in dicta con~idered the question whetlwr a dismissal pursuant to a
motion rnade unde>r Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P., results in a
.indgrnent on the nwrits. In that casr, plaintiffs filed
separate aetions againp,t defendant for in;jnries incurred
11>" them whilt· in defon<lant's employ. 'rlw C"ases involvc•d
illl~ntical issues and were argued together. The Complaints alleged claims under the ,Jones Act and in the
nlt<•rnativt' under eornrnon law negligence doctrines in
maritime law. Defendant filed motions to dismiss for
f'ailnrP to state claims upon which relief could he granted.
ThP District Court granted the 111otions and ordered that
tilt> suits he disrnisr-w<1, without prejudice. On appeal, the
('OUrt noted that thP ground for dismissal in each ease
\\·as failurP to statt• a ('lairn upon which relief could he
grnnt0d, hut that the aixnnwnts advanced, to ~mstain the
dismis:-·ml, rested, not upon a failure to state a claim upon
whieh relief could he granted, hut upon misjoinder of
e]aims, failure to PIPet lwtween mutua1ly exclusive causes
of action, \\T<mg <·hoic·e of fonun and various formal defeds. Tlw Cireuit Conrt rPv<>rst>d tlw dismissals and,
with n·s1wd to th<' dfed of a flismissal npon motion,
:-' a.i c1 :
·•\\.t• assiuue that thP foreµ;oing is also a fair state11wnt of the issu<'s prt>st>ntt>d to tlw District Court
in support of tile motions to dismiss tlw aetions.
In onr opinim1, tlw~' rornplPtt>ly rnistake the fnnet ions or t lie motion to dismiss for failure to stat(~ a
<·lai111. _h· -,·frtfc·r/ i11 :2 Jfnor1·\: Federal Pructicc,
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2d. Ed., par. 1209 at p. 2257, 'The Motio.n to Dism.iss for failure to state a claim raises matter in
bar and, if su.stained im'.thout foave to plea.d further, results in a .iudgme>nt on the merits.'" (Emphasis added).
The function of a motion under Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P.
to provide a method for a determination with prejudice of
the nwrits of a Complai•nt was acc(•pted in L. R. vVifsoiu,

Jiu-. r. Federal Comn11111ications Conzmission. 170 F. 2<l
793, where the eourt said:
"A demurrer at the common law (or a motion
to dismiss, the substitute in present Federal Court
practice for the demurrer) is not a mere procedural nieety. On the contrary it is a precise instrument for final determination on the merits of the
jnsticibility under iwrtinent rules of law of an
nsserte>d cause of aC'tion or defense. Sustaining a
d(~mmTer pnts the part 'ag-aim;t whm;p pleading- it
i·s dire>rtt~d }H'rmanently out of ronrt, unless he is
allowed to amend and ean amend.''
In 2 Moore's Federal Practict>, 2d Ed. par. 12.09, p. 2257,
the> writt>r notes that Rule 12 ( b) (G), F.R.C.P., is pro1wrly
integrafrd with Rule 5G, 1''.R.C.P., sinct> motions under
both raise only matters on the merits of the easP. TliP
granting of an i<lN1tieal rnotion against tlie seeond Con1µlaint was rel·o1.mizNl by ~ll>Jwllant as lwinµ; with pre.indiee.

13
Since tlw dismissal on the first Complaint was a
final judgment, the matters set forth in the new Complaint are res judicata between appellant and respondPnt. Appellant allegvd but one invasion of his rights
in both Complaints. 'The question of appellant's right to
recover against respondent for that invasion was litgated
in the first lawsut. In Knight v. Flat Top Miming Company, G (~tah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 50?,, the court stated that
isf'ues concerning ~whirh a party or his privy had had an
opportunity to litigatt> in a prior action, could not be
rPorwne<l in a snhseqnent suit. The Court said:
.. 'It is a fundamental prineiple of jurisprudence that material facts or queHtions which were
in issue in a former aetion, and were there admitted or judicially determined, are rondusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein, and that
such facts or questions become rps judicata and
may not again he litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies, n•gardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action .... '

"'rhe Bl'ehive claimants having had an opportunity to dt'fend their title to their e.laims in
that ease had they so desired and having failed
to do so were precluded from relitigating the same
issues in the instant case in so far as the rig·hts of
the sam<-.• partiPs or thPir snc·eessors in intl'rest are
conCf'l'nNl. ·~
On<' all<:.•p;t>d inva::-ion of rights cannot }w nt'ed by ap1wllnnt to ::-nh.iPC"t l'PSJl<inclr•nt to one ~nit aftl'r another. In

14
11'illiamsou

i·.

ColumlJia Gas & El('ctric Co., 18() li'.2d .J.G-1.

the rourt dealt with this question and said:
" . . . The plaintiff having alleged operative
facts which state a eause of action becam;p ht> t<'lb
of defendant's rniseondud and his own harm has
had his day in eourt. l le dOPs not get another cla>·
aftPr the first la"Tsuit is eonelm1Pd l>y giving a
diffon•nt n'ason than ht> gavP in tht' first for
recovery of damages for the same invasion of his
rights. rrhe problem of his rights against the defendant hased upon the alleged wrongful acts is
fully' bPfor<' tlw eourt whether all tlw reasons for
reC'oVPry wel'P stated to the rourt or not.''

The g01wrally reeogni:r.ed S<'OJl<:> of t1w doctrine is :-;pt
forth in 30 A Am. J11r., .l11dqmcnts, Ree. :372, p. ·HG, wlwrP
it is stated:
"The phase of the doctrinP of res judicata prPeluding suhRPquPnt litigation of the saint> cam;e of
action is 11meh hroadPr in its application than a
(h~tNrnination of tlw quPRtions involwd in the
prior aetion; the conelusivPness of the judgrnpnt
in sueh ea:-;p PXt<·nds not onl;'>' to mattPrs aduall>·
determin<>d, hut also to other matt<•rs whiC'l1 <'onld
prorH'rl:-' Jrnv<· lH·c·n <1<'t<·1·rni1wd in ilt<> llrior :1<'ti OJl.
The .:\fotion to

tltP l'n('ts pl('ad<•d

a~

Dis1ui~s

th(•

fir~t

C'oniplaint ac·c·eptPd

tnw for purpo:-\(''"'

:.1c1dt·(•ssPd it:-c<•lf t() tl1''

:-\lll1~tanl iY(•

,,i· tlH·

1noti011 and

111<·ril:-c of tl1<• <'l:1i111_
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merits in the lower court, and such dismissal must he
with prejudice, and the matter is res judicata between the
partit>s. Appellant's remedy for the first dismissal, if a
rt>nwd~r <xists, lies in an appeal to this Court from that
flismissal and not in the filing of a new lawsuit.
1

POINT II
THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION OF
APPELLANT'S SECOND COMPLAINT FAIL TO
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED BY REASON
OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1, U.C.A. (1953).

It is conceded hy appellant that Davis was its. man-

ager and had authority to sibrn checks for it. (Appellant's
Brit>f pp. 8, 14-). rrhe Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Section
22-1-1, U.C.A. (1953), defines the term fiduciary as follow!':

••'Fiduciary' includes a trustee of any trust,
implied, re~mlting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, consevator, curator, re<·eiver, trustee in hankruptey, assignee for
the benefit of rreditors partner, agf•nt, officer of
a corporation, public or private, public officer,
or any other pt>rson aeting in a fiduciary capacity
for any person, trust or <state.''

<1 xpressf•d,

1

As manag<>r of appellant Davis clearly was (l) its agent;
(2) an offi<-er of tlw eoq)()ration: and (3) a per:;on acting
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in a fiduciary caparity, and the inclusion of Davis in any
one of those three categories. is sufficient to bring n'spondent's dealings with Davis -within the purview of
Title 22, Chapter 1, F.C.A. (\953). In a closely analagous
ease under the same statute, Fiddity and Deposit Co.
of Md. v. Marion Nat'l. Bank, 6-1 N.E. 583, the rourt held
that an employee who ·was authorizPd to endorse for
deposit or negotiation all negotiable instnmwnts arnl
ord~rs for pa~mient to his employer ·was a fiduc,iary
within the meaning of this aet. Tht> rule of the Fidelity
and Deposit case enrmnpasses the fartual relationship
existing hehve<'n Davis and ap1wllant in the instant casL'
and the same result should be reached.
COUNT I OF FIRST CA USE O:B, ACTION:
Count I of the First Cause of Action alleges tlwt
3:2 checks, endorsNl "'ith signatures other than those of
the named pa~'ei:>s, WPre drawn npon appellant's account
·with defendant \\'alkPr Bank & rrrnst Cornpan~, and
presrnted to n•spon<lt>nt h~· Davis or his agent for deposit
and erPditP<l hy n•spond<>nt to nn arconnt or a.(·eo1mts
O\n1t>d h~' Davis. ~mw of tlw <'llP('ks wel'P payahl<' to
Davis. DasPd npon tli<>s<' a!Pg:at!ons of fact ap1wllant
allrg('S tltat rt..·spondt'nt was nt-glig1•nt in ( 1) failing to
eom}Yal'<' th<' ·<·ndors<'nwnts on tl1<• <·ht'<·l~s with tltP signatnrP of Davis; ( :2) in failing to n·qnirP tlw Pnd(lrsp111Pnt
of the iwrson <l<'positi11g- th<· ('}w<'k or th<• 1wrson to \Yhom
(']"edit was µ;iv<·n; HlHl
in fail inµ: to r<'<·ognizP a sehernt>
\\'liieh \nrnlcl lim·1· h(•Pn cl'.s1·lc>s<'d hy (]1<· 1uuliipli<';t:· ,,f

(:n
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transactions. Count I then alleges that knowledge of the
foregoing facts constitutes bad faith and that respondent
had actual knowledge that Davis was committing a breach
of his fiduciary ohlig·ation.
It is clear that the ('laim of negligence fails to state
a claim against respondent upon which relief can be
granted. Section 22-1-9, IT.C.A. ( 1953), as applicable here
provides:
"lf a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank to
his personal credit . . . of checks drawn by him
upon an account in the name of his principal, if he
is empowerPd to draw checks thereon ... or if he
otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by him
as fiduciary, tlw bank receiving such deposit is
not bound to inqure whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the
amount of thf' deposit or any part thereof upon
the personal check of the fiduciary without being
liable to tlH• prineipal, actual knowledge that the
fiduciary is rommitting a breach of his obligation
as fiduria.ry in making :mch deposit or drawing
such check, or with knowledge of sud1 facts that
its action in rt•ceiving the deposit or paying the
eheck arnounh• to bad faith.''
The farts allPge<l by appf'llant in Count I as a matter
of law fall short of t>stahlishing bad faitJi. Paragraph 9
stah-s:
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"9. That the honoring of s aid checks with
Immdedge of the above and foregoing facts
amounts to bad faith on the part of the defendant,
Zions First National Bank."
1

Section 22-1-1, U.C.A. (1953) defines good faith m the
following language :
"A thing iH done in 'good faith' when in faet
it is done honestly, whether it is done negligently_
or not."

The courts have looked to this definition of good faith to
determine the meaning of the term bad faith in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. In Colby v. Riggs National Bank,
92 F.2d 183, the court said that acts done ":rith knowledge
of such facts as amounts to had faith under the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act lllPans acts done dishont>stly in vit>I\'
of the definition of good faith in the act. The case of
Davis r. I'em1sylra11ia Co. for lns11rm1ces on Lives mul
Oranfillff Am111if i<'s, 12 A.:M ()(i, <lea.It with the nwaning·
of bad faith as nsP<l in sN·tion !J of thl' act, tlw same seetion as ~ection :2:2-l-!), CC.A. (1~lil:\). TIH• court sai<l that
men• failnn' to 111ak(' inquir:,, <'YPn tl10ug-li tlwn-' ar<> suspieious eirC'm11stanr<>s, d<ws not constitute had faith unlPss
the faih1rP i:-; dtw to a fh·lilH•rat<' desirP to Pvade knowledgP lw('au:-;c• of f<•nr 1ltat inqnir:, would (lisc·los1• a vieP
ur <lefrd in tlt1· tnm:-;adion, and that a thing i:-; <lone in
had faith, within tliP 111Paning- of tl1<> ad, only wl1Pn it is
(lonP dishonest l:\. /\, J>JH'llant ':-; allPgatious in Count I do
11ot s<>t fort11 l"a<'1,: tli~it e111d<l <·omditu1L• or support a
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claim of dishonesty on the part of respondent, and the
acts of respondent of which appellant complains are, as
a matter of law, within the protection afforded respondent under Rection 22-1-~), F.C.A. (1953).
The allrgation in paragraph 10 of Count One that
n•spond<>nt paid on Sll<'h elwcks with actual knowledge
that Davis was committing a breach of his fiduciary obligation in making a deposit of such checks pleads a conclusion that is not supported hy facts alleged in the
Count. Appellant has not plead supporting facts of
which it elaims r<>spon<lPnt had knowledge that would
constitute or support a claim of actual knowledge of a
brPach of Davis' fiduciary obligation. Facts 11,ecessary
to support a dairn of actual knowledge must be of a
more eulpahh• nature than facts necessary to establish
had faith, and since appellant's allegations in Count I
fail to support tlH' claim of had faith, they cannot substantiate the ronrlusion of actual knowledge. Since Count
I fail.s to state a claim against respondent upon which
relief ean be grant<'d ht>emu;e of tlw application of Section
22-1-~),

r.C.A. ( 1D;)3), tlw lower con rt properly granted

rt>spondent's :\lotion to Dismiss as to this Count.

Count II of tht> Fin;;t Cause of Action alleges that
the Pnd.orsPrnPnh..: on tht> 32 checks in question wPre
1mauthoriz.ed forgPries, an<l that rt>spondent honorPd the

<'hecks despite the forgeries m violation of a duty to
determine the genuineness of the c>ndonwments. Appellant then claims that the hr(>Jach of the duty with knowledge of the facts alleged in Count I constituted had faith.
Dishonesty on the part of respondent is not alleged.
Count II also fails to state a claim against respondent
npon whieh relief can be granh~d heeause the facts alleg-ed
do not support a elaim of liad faith which requires that
bad faith amount to cfo.;honesty under Seetion 22-1-9,
r.c.A. (19!)~). Colby v. Ri,qqs, supra, Davis V. Pennsyl'/J(lnia Company Insurances on Lices and Gramting A•nnii-

ities. supra.

SECOND CAFRE OF AC1'ION:
The 8Peond Cause of Adion involvPs thrf'P ehecks
allegedl~' drawn hy Davis aiul anotlwr <•rnployt'P of app<·llant on appr>llant's ae<'onnt \\'ith dd<"ndant ·walker Ba11k
& ri'rust Cornpany. Two of thP ('hl'c·ks w<>rr> payalilP only
to respond<•nt arnl om· eh<'f'k was payahlP to r<'sp01Hk•11t
and a c•o111pany known as Tn•asnt·p :\lmrntai11 !•'ina11<·<·.
It is all<'g<>cl that th<·~;p <'h<'<'ks WPr<' dPpositPd with n•s.pondPi1t in U<'C'onnts o\\·1w<l h)' Davis, and. that in transforrinp; funds in tllf• fon·g·oinp; fashion \\'ithout n'qui ring·
nn~' d<>mm1strntion of autltorit)· for tlw transfer or tlw
(•ndorsPlll<>nt of DaYis, r<'sponclvnt \\·a~ nc'g-ligPnt and
acted in bnd faith.
As prPviousl>' not<•<l tli<· altPgation~ of n<'µ;lip;<·rn•\•
fail to stat<> n <'In im n!!.·n i m~t n'~pond< ·11t n pon \\'hi<' h n· l i <' f'
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ran he granted. Section :22-1-9, U.C.A. (1953), supra.. In
addition tlw allegations of the Second Cause of Action
do not constitute had faith in that no facts amounting to
dishon0sty arP alleged. Colby v. Ri,q9s National Ban,k,
:-:npra; Davis u. Pennsyh·nnia for Insi1rances on Lives
und Granting A11n11ities, supra. An allegation that the
!'Pspondent shoukl havP made inquiry from its knowledge
of the facts alleged, where a willful and deliherate evasion of knowledge> is not alleged, does not constitute bad
faith under the :;;tatutf'. Transport Trucking Company
r. First National Bank, :~00 P.2d 47G. The Second Cause
of Action was properly dismissed on respondent's motion.
POINT III
RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO APPELLANT
TO DETERMINE THE GENUINENESS OF PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS,

AND

APPELLANT'S

CLAIM

THAT THE CHECKS WERE FORGERIES DOES NOT
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

Point l U of appellant's brief argues at l<'ngth that
the <·lweh involved in the ease were forgt•d instruments
ratlwr than lwan•r papPr. Count II of tlw First Cam;e
of A('tlon allPg<'s that the endorsenwnts were forged,
and respon<lPnt di<l not dispute this allegation for purposes of its :\lotion to Dis111iss and does not <lispuh• it
on this appeal. lloweYPl", as a mntter of law respondent

is not liable to appellant for accPpting for deposit forged
instruments from appellant's fiduciary in the absense of
bad faith or actual knowledge of a breach of the fiduciary
obligation. Section 22-1-9, U. C.A. ( 1953), sup1~a, make8
no exceptions for forged instruments. lt statt•s in substance that if a fiduciary makes a deposit of a ehe('k
drawn on his principals' account, the hank receiving tlw
('heck for d(~posit is not hound to mak0 inquiry and is
not liable to the principal in the ahsenep of adual knowl1:•dge of tlu• hr<>aeh or knowlPdg<• of fads snffieif'nt to
constitute had faith. This sections fits exa('tly the facts
alll:'ged in the instant case.
Appellant's argument that respondent had a dut:--'
to its d0positors to dt>termin<' thP p;enuineness of endorsP111ents is not in point in thi:-; ('a'SP. Appellant was not
all<-'gt'd to lw a dPpositor of rPspondPnt; in fad, it is
affinuativt>ly allegPd that the elwcks \\'Pl'<' drawn on
a PJH_•l\ant 's aecount with (ldendant v\'alkr>r Bank & Trust
Corn pan>'. '\Vhat<>ve r rt>s pon<len t 's dut:--· to its own <lPpos i tors ma~· IH', it hud no <lnt>' to appt>llant to dPt<>nnim·
th<• j..?,'('Tlllin<•l1('88 or' Pndol'S('llWl1ts WIWn dealing with appt•llant's fid1wiar>· in vi<•\\' of thP pro\·ision...; of f·kdion :L~
l -9, r.C.A. ( 1~l.):1), ~nprn. Tli<> ea.-:(' C"ite<l Ji:, amwll:rnt
,<..,'fanrlarrl .fr1·. /!Is. ('n. 1·. I'elledio, 10+ A.~<1 ~~~, nnll
the nrg1111wnt i11YC>h·inp: gnn rnnh·(• nl' prior c•11clon:(•!1l!'111~
are not in point i11 this <·:\,.:('. TlH•l'l' i:-; 110 nllPp:ation in
Count TT ol' tlH· l•~ir:-;I Can~:c· of Af'ti(l]1, or <·],.:('Wlwn• in
np1w1lnnt's Co111plai11t. tlint rc•;;pornh·nt µ:1wrnnt<·<·d pl'ior
<·ndorse11w11t:-; 011 tl11· <'lt,·(·k..; i11 q1wc-:tion, Hll<l th<• Co111-

plaint dot>s not :wt forth a cause of action based upon a
right of n-'cov<•ry for a guarantee of prior endorsements.
POINT IV
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953),
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INST ANT CASE.

Section 22-1-!), F.C.A. (1953), in substance states,
among other things, that, if a check is drawn in favor
of a payt:•f> who knows that the transaction is for the
henPfit of the fiduciary tl1t• payee is liable to the principal
if thP fidneiar>· tlwreby commits a breach of his obligation. ff this seC'tion is applied to depository hanks, it is
c·learl>· inC'onsistent ~with and C'ontrary to Seeton 22-1-9,
1 :.C.A. ( 195:1), supra. Tlw t>ntire act, must he read togdher' to deh'rrnine its intPnt and application and to
l'Psolv<> appan•nt inC'om;istPnC'ies. In legislative construction a general provision, such as Section 22-1-3, U.C.A.
( L95:l), sltonld not lw h1>ld to snpt•n·<·cle a speeifi<' vrovision, sneh as Seetion 22-1-9, 1-.C.,\. ( 1953).

A n•vw\\' of thL•se sPctions, wlwn eonstrued with
l'Plakd st>etions and in light of the Connnissioner's prPfatm·>· not<•s to th<' 1-niforrn Fidneiaries Act discloses
tltnt Sedions 22-1-8 and 9, r.C.A. (195:)), were intended
to µ;rn·<·1·11 all <h•pository hank dealings \\'ith fiduciariE>s
to thP ex<·lusion of SPction 22-1-5, LC.A. ( 1953). In 9B,
{'11i/or111

L11ws .1111111fated.

(l~H)G),

Jing<' :J;1. the Corn-

"Sections 4, 5 and G deal with holders of
negotiable paper drawn or endorsed by fiduciaries."
And at page 40, id, the note states:
"Sections 7, 8 and 9 deal with depositories
of fiduciary funds."
Section 22-1-9, e.C.A. (1953), makes no exceptions
as to who may be payres when it allows banks to ac.cept
deposits from a fiduciary without liability to the prineipal in the absence of had faith or actual knowledge of
the breach of the fiduciary duty. Even more persuasiv1i
that Section 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953) does not apply to a
depository bank, however, are the provisions of Sections
22-1-7 and 8, U.C.A. (1953). Section 22-1-7, U.C.A. (1953),
deals with deposits to the credit of fiduciaries and states
in part:
" .. If, howevt>r, sueh a check is payable to the
draw£>e hank and is d<>liverPd to it in payment of 01·
as sf>(•urity for a pPrsonal dt>bt of thr fiduciary to
it, the hank is liable to tht> prineipal if thP fidneiary in faet commits a hrearh of his obligation
as fidueiary in drawing or delivPrng the ehPck."

Section 22-1-8, CC.A. ( 195:q, involves deposits by fiduC'iaries in tlw na111<> of tlw prineipal, and contains exaetly
the same language as 22-1-7, 1.1.C.A. (1953). If Section
22-1-5, r.C.A. (195:~), \\'Pl"(-' applicable to dPpository
banks, thPn thP quott><l provisions of Sections 22-1-7
nnd 8, r.C.A. ( l!l;):1), would lw meaninglPss and nullitie8.
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It is apparent that the legislature intended a differPnt treatment for depository hanks named as payee
on checks deposited hy fiduciaries from that afforded
hy St>ction 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953), or it would not have
enactt>d the ahovP quoted portions of St>ctions 22-1-7 and
~. r.c.A. (1953). This is evPn more clear when it is
noted that Sections 22-1-7 and 8, U.C.A. (1953), make
no mention of a depository bank's liability to the principal when designated payee on a check unless the check is
USl'<i in payment of or as security for a personal debt
of the fiduiciary. No liahility is imposed for knowing the
transaction to be for the benefit of the fiduciary.
POINT V
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO LOSS BY REASON
OF THE ALLEGED ACTS OF RESPONDENT.

Appellant's Complant alleges that all of the checks
involved in tlw ca:se werp drawn on it:-; account with
defendant vValkPr Bank & Tru:-;t Company. Appellant
suffrrPd no lo:-;t-1 by reason of respondent's conduct, its
allPg-ed loss }wing ::mstained onl~' hy tlu• alleged action
of defrn<lant "Talker Bank & rrrust Company in wrongfull~- eharging the <'lweks to apywllant's aceount. The two
(•arn..:p;-; of a<·tion allPged against respondent in the Complaint allege that ap1wllant\.; loss was a reRult of respondent's activity, hnt n.s a matter of law such allegations fail to state of (•lai111 against rPspondent upon whirh
relief ean l>P grnnt<>d when• thP Complaint abo alll•ge~
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that every check was drawn against its aooount at another
bank.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
ruled correctly in dismissing appellant's second Complaint in Case No. 171406 for the reasons set forth
herein. The Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
.John 11'. Pien•py
Attorney for Respondent

